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1 Proof of Equilibrium Uniqueness in the Beauty Contest Game
This section shows that the equilibrium of the action game in section 1 of the main text is unique.
It does that by adapting an argument ¯rst made Angeletos and Pavan (2007, propositions 1 and
3) to our environment. The idea of the proof is that there is a social planner problem such that
every equilibrium of our model is also a solution to this planning problem. The planning problem
is strictly convex, meaning that it has a unique minimum. Since the planning problem has a unique
solution and every equilibrium is a solution to the planning problem, the equilibrium of the model
must be unique.
We begin by setting up some notation for the proof. We let ^ p(¢) denote the candidate equilib-
rium function characterized by equation (4) in the main text, and will make use of the fact that
s = b0!. We let F (!) denote the prior distribution of !, with density f (!). We let ¹ denote the
distribution of the agents' information choices, and Á(Xzj!) the distribution of observed signals,
conditional on the state !. Together, ¹ and Á determine the distribution F (Ij!)of information
sets I = (Â;Xz), conditional on the state !. The agents' posterior beliefs conditional on I are
de¯ned by the pdf
^ Á(!jI) =
Á(Xzj!)f (!) R
^ ! Á(Xzj^ !)dF (^ !)
.














1for all but a zero measure of types. Then, ~ p 2 P, if and only if ~ p = ^ p, almost everywhere.
That is, up to a measure zero perturbation, the equilibrium strategies are uniquely characterized
by equation (4) in the main text.













p(I)dF (Ij!) ¡ b0!
¶2
dF (!)
Step 1 shows that L(p) is strictly convex in p, which implies that if ~ p1; ~ p2 2 argminp L(p),
~ p1 = ~ p2 almost everywhere. Step 2 shows that P = argminp L(p). But then, ~ p1; ~ p2 2 P implies
~ p1 = ~ p2 almost everywhere, and the proposition then follows from noting that ^ p 2 P.
Step 1: L(p) is strictly convex for all p. For arbitrary functions p1 and p2, and ® 2 (0;1),
notice that ®p1 + (1 ¡ ®)p2 = p1 + (1 ¡ ®)¢ = p2 ¡ ®¢, where ¢ = p2 ¡ p1. After some algebra,
one obtains:
L(®p1 + (1 ¡ ®)p2) ¡ ®L(p1) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)L(p2)
= ®[L(p1 + (1 ¡ ®)¢) ¡ L(p1)] + (1 ¡ ®)[L(p2 ¡ ®¢) ¡ L(p2)]
















V ar(¢(I)j!) + (1 ¡ r)[E(¢(I)j!)]
2
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2 dF (Ij!) ¡ [E(¢(I)j!)]
2 .
Moreover, the last inequality is strict, whenever p1 (I) 6= p2 (I) for a positive measure of I's,
implying that for any p1;p2 2 argminp L(p), p1 (I) = p2 (I) for almost every I.
Step 2: P = argminp L(p). For arbitrary p(¢) and ± (¢) and a scalar t,









































2Clearly, A(±) > 0, for all ± (¢) for which
R
I (± (I))
2 dF (Ij!) > 0 (i.e. that are di®erent
from zero for a positive measure of types). Then, for any pair (p;±), L(p + t±) is minimized at
t¤ = ¡B2 (p;±)=A(±), and L(p + t¤±) = L(p) ¡ B2 (p;±)=A(±). Therefore, ~ p 2 argminp L(p) if
and only if B (~ p;±) = 0, for every ± (¢).



















































































Since ^ Á(!jI) = Á(Xzj!)f (!)=
R

















































^ Á(^ !jI)d^ !
¾
dF (Ij!)dF (!)
Therefore, ~ p 2 P implies B (~ p;±) = 0 for all ±, and ~ p 2 argminp L(p). For ~ p = 2 P, setting





















2 dF (Ij!)dF (!) > 0, which implies ~ p = 2 argminp L(p).
2 General Equilibrium Foundations for Planning Model
In this appendix, we derive micro-foundations for our dynamic planning and price adjustment model
from a fully speci¯ed dynamic general equilibrium model. On the household side, our formulation
follows the continuous time model Golosov and Lucas (2007). On the ¯rm side however, there are
distinct di®erences, as Golosov and Lucas generate nominal rigidities through menu costs of price
adjustment, whereas here, they arise from the ¯rms' cost of planning.
Time is continuous and in¯nite. There is a measure 1 continuum of di®erent intermediate
goods, indexed by i 2 [0;1], each produced by one monopolistic ¯rm using labor as the unique
3input into production. There is a ¯nal consumption good, which is produced by a perfectly com-
petitive ¯nal goods sector using the continuum of intermediates according to a Dixit-Stiglitz CES
technology with constant returns to scale. On the consumption side, there is an in¯nitely-lived
representative household, who purchases the ¯nal consumption good and supplies labor to the in-
termediate ¯rms. Finally, there is a complete set of markets for contingent nominal bonds. Markets
are open continuously, and ¯rms continuously adjust prices, but they only update their information
infrequently.
Money Supply Process: The Logarithm of nominal money supply follows an exogenous
Brownian Motion with no drift, and a di®usion parameter ¾:
dlogMt = ¹dt + ¾dZt
nominal money injections take the form of lump sum taxes or transfers to the representative house-
hold.
Representative Household: The representative household's preferences are de¯ned over the























where ½ denotes the discount rate, Pt the price of the ¯nal consumption good, and Md
t the demand
for nominal balances.
Let Qt denote the process for the shadow price of nominal cash °ows, so that an earnings
stream fDtg
1
















where ¦t indicates the income from nominal pro¯ts and lump sum money transfers, and Rt
denotes the nominal interest rate, which is implicitly de¯ned by Qt = eRtdtEt (Qt+dt). The
term RtMd










Final Good Producers: A large number of ¯nal goods producers uses the intermediate goods













4Final goods producers maximize pro¯ts, taking as given the market prices of intermediate and
¯nal goods. For a total demand Yt of the ¯nal good by the household, a ¯nal goods price Pt, and
input prices Pi


























Intermediate Good Producers: Each intermediate good is produced by a single monopolist
¯rm, using labor lit as an input, according to
yit = Al®
it , (6)
for some A > 0, and ® · 1. Firms' nominal pro¯ts in period t, not including planning costs, are

















Each ¯rm faces a ¯xed labor cost F, if they decide to update their information or \plan". The ¯rm





0 , and a process of planning dates Di (t), where dDi (t) = 1












taking as given the processes fQt;Pt;Wt;Ytg
1
0 , and its date-0 expectations Ei
0 [¢].











0 , for each i, that solve the ¯rms' and household's op-
timization problem, and clear goods and labor markets: At every date t, MD
t = Mt, Ct = Yt (in
the ¯rm's problem), and labor supply nt equals the total labor demand for production and plan-
ning purposes. The following proposition summarizes the solution to the representative household
problem:
Proposition 2 There exists a market equilibrium, in which the following conditions hold:
(i) Nominal interest rates are constant: Rt = R = ½ + ¹ ¡ 1=2¾2.
5(ii) The nominal wage rate is proportional to Mt: Wt = ±RMt






(iv) The state-price process is Qt = 1=(RÂ) ¢ e¡½t (Mt)
¡1, where Â denotes the Lagrange mul-
tiplier on the Household's budget constraint.
Proof. The household's ¯rst-order conditions w.r.t. Ct, Mt and nt satisfy e¡½tC¡"
t = ÂPtQt,
e¡½tM¡1
t = RtQt and e¡½t± = ÂWtQt. From these three conditions, (ii), (iii) and (iv) follow
immediately.
We therefore just need to show that the equilibrium nominal interest rate is indeed con-
stant. Rt satis¯es Qt = eRtdtEt (Qt+dt). Using the FOC for Mt, we have Et (Qt+dt=Qt) =
e¡½dtEt (RtMt=(Rt+dtMt+dt)). We conjecture (and verify) that Rt = R indeed solves this con-
dition: In that case, Et (RtMt=(Rt+dtMt+dt)) = Et (Mt=Mt+dt) = e¡¹dt+1=2¾2dt. Therefore the
condition for Rt becomes 1 = eRtdte¡½dte¡¹dt+1=2¾2dt, or, after taking logs, Rt = ½ + ¹ ¡ 1=2¾2
These properties follow from our assumptions that (i) the disutility of labor is linear, (ii)
preferences for real balances are logarithmic, and (iii) nominal spending shocks follow a Brownian
motion (without mean reversion). Since these properties do not rely in any way on the exact form
of the labor demand or individual pricing processes on the intermediate ¯rm's side, they directly
apply also to our model in which there are planning, instead of price adjustment costs.
>From here on, we will assume that equilibrium nominal wages, state prices and real demand
are governed by the above processes. We focus on the intermediate ¯rm's pricing and planning
problem.
Pricing and Planning Decisions: The updating decisions take place as described in the
main text. In what follows, we will use the same notation for information sets and expectations.
Substituting the state price process, the real demand, and the nominal wage rate into the interme-
diate ¯rm's pro¯t function, the ¯rms' period-t pro¯ts, not including information costs, and valued



























Therefore, the full model's counterpart to the ¯rm's reduced form objective (equation 9 of the main
































6with the average price Pt given by (5). With this structure, our equilibrium de¯nition from the
main text applies identically.













where r = 1 ¡
1 + "¡1 (1 ¡ ®)=®
1 + µ(1 ¡ ®)=®
. (12)
We normalize A so that the initial constant term is equal to 1. Taking logarithms, we ¯nd an
expression for logP¤ (t), which mirrors equation (10) from the main text:
logP¤
t = (1 ¡ r)log(RMt) + rlogPt.




Second-order approximation: We conclude this appendix by showing that the reduced-
form formulation considered in the main text is a second-order approximation to the full general
equilibrium formulation considered here. We take a constant (¯rst term) and subtract from it the


















The last integral term represents information costs. Substituting in the formulas for Wt and Qt
from proposition 1, it becomes ¡±F
R 1
0 e¡½tdDi (t).








































































The linearized ¯rst-order condition tells us that under full information, RtMt = Pt. Therefore,




t and using a second-order Taylor expansion around xi






















































This mirrors the objective in the planning model (equation 4 of the paper), once we de¯ne the
planning cost as 2±F=((1 ¡ µ + µ=®)(µ ¡ 1)).
Comparative Statics Finally, we examine the relationship between the structural parameters
and two key parameters in the reduced-form model of the main text that determine price rigidity
and updating frequency. One is r, the complementarity in price-setting, de¯ned in equation (12).
There are three underlying structural parameters that determine complementarity. First, relative
risk aversion ² increases complementarity (@r=@² > 0). Second, the elasticity of substitution µ
increases complementarity (@r=@µ > 0). Finally, the rate of diminishing marginal returns to labor
® increases complementarity i® µ > 1=².
The second key determinant of updating frequency is the cost of information. In this micro-
founded model, that cost is a labor cost and therefore varies over time with the wage. The planning
cost is increasing in ® and decreasing in µ, as long as there are diminishing returns ® < 1 and
elasticity µ > 1. Therefore, if µ > 1=², then increases in ® increase complementarity and increase
the planning cost, both of which make updating less frequent and prices more sticky. But the
e®ect of changes in elasticity µ are ambiguous because they increase complementarity but decrease
planning costs.
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